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This dissertation comprises of two essays. The first essay, ‘Index Price Discovery in the Cash Market’, 
employs Hasbrouck’s (2003) information share method to analyze the flow of information in equity markets. 
In particular I compare trading in Index ETFs with that of their underlying securities. Surprisingly, ETFs 
seem to play a significant role in the price discovery process, rather than serving as passive 
indexing/hedging vehicles. Using TAQ data I reconstruct the second-by-second intraday price series for the 
S&P 500 using its component stocks. Results show that the ETF contributes almost half of the price 
formation of S&P 500 in the spot market. Next, comparing trades and quotes, We determine the relative 
amount of informed trading (versus noise) in the ETF. When the trading of ETFs is driven more by private 
information, the ETF contributes more to the price discovery in the S&P 500 spot market. Thus, the 
evidence suggests that a portion of ETF trading is information motivated, similar to individual stocks in the 
index. 
The second essay, ‘Institutional Flow and Information’, studies the dynamics of institutions’ trading 
behavior and the information of the market using a high-frequency dataset. The daily institutional flows are 
estimated in a linear model which differentiates trades by their size. I find in a structural Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) system that the amount of trading that is private-information based has a negative contemporaneous 
relationship with the daily changes of institutional ownership in five of the six stocks studied. The findings 
prove that the trading pattern of institutional investors is related to the degree of information asymmetry in 





CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is comprised of two essays. The first essay, ‘Index price discovery in the cash market’, 
probes the information dissemination process of the trading on ETF and index component stocks and its 
implications on the index. The second essay, ‘Institutional trading and information’, examines the role of 
institutional investors in the trading of ETF and index component stocks. A unified theme underlying the 
two essays is a study on old and new channels of information diffusion via different assets and market 
players. 
Ideas of the first essay came in the wake of flash crash of the stock market in May 2010. One of the public 
opinion was that error in program trading of ETF brought down the price stability protection causing a 
market wide panic. This event intensifies the common interests in ETF as it continues to grow very fast in 
size and gain more popularity among investors. Research wise, it leads to a much broader topic that focuses 
on how the trading shaped up by current technology determines the information flow from the 
microstructural perspective. The objective is to reveal that information is revealed in the trading of ETF, 
which was considered in the past as a passive investment financial vehicle, and how it is factored into the 
price level of market indices, which ETF is designed to replicate. 
Empirical results of the first essay show that ETF has redefined itself as an important of price discovery 
process of the underlying index, which give rise to the second essay focusing on institutional investors who 
are the major players in ETF trading. However, the discussion is extended to the general study of 
institutional investors’ trading behavior. To what extent their trading is information based has direct 
implications on explaining the phenomenon found in the first essay and other observations. 
Both essays deal with the set of core questions concerning high frequency trading and how it affects the 
information dissemination mechanism. They also share the use of same data resources, econometric models, 
and empirical designs. Nevertheless, each essay has its own focus and approach to the problems and 




CHAPTER 2: INDEX PRICE DISCOVERY IN THE CASH MARKET 
2.1 Introduction 
The rapidly growing ETF market has much advanced the way people invest. Uninformed traders are 
motivated to trade basket security rather than individual securities to avoid being taken advantage of by 
informed traders. With the advent of ETF, not only institutional investors but also individuals can easily 
trade indexes, which are baskets of securities. Investors flock to ETF for the same reason they used to 
embrace index futures: less adverse selection costs. Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) point out that a basket as 
a composite security has lower rate of return variance because of lower level of information asymmetries. 
The advantages of ETF over futures are straightforward. Investors can easily trade the entire portfolio with 
no capital restriction or the complicated impacts of expiration of futures contracts. Ironically, ETF is 
criticized for the same reason index futures were. Both of them arguably destabilize prices by encouraging 
irrational speculation. That is, the proportion of noise trading would rise. Specifically, ETF was blamed for 
the flash crash in May 2010. 
Recent trends show that ETF is no longer considered a tool merely for diversification or indexing. 
Hasbrouck (2003) reveals that the trading of ETF affects the short-run price dynamics in the U.S. equity 
index markets comprising index futures and cash markets. Although the impact is of second order 
compared to that of futures trading, it is no doubt that its importance is on the rising. 
In this paper, We propose a method to reconstruct the intraday series of the index portfolio trading from its 
component stocks. The reconstructed data allows us to study the price dynamics of the entire spot market 
for equity index trading. If ETF is used simply for indexing, it would not contribute much to the price 
formation. Results show that ETF contributes on average 45% of the total information share of the 
underlying random walk process of S&P 500 against the synthesized index portfolio. 
The second contribution of this paper is to relate the price discovery to the information contents of ETF 
trading. Following Hasbrouck (1991b), We decompose the price movements of ETF into private 
information based and public information based. If ETF is used simply for indexing, its information 
composition should be fairly uniform and not be related to the price formation of the index. Empirically We 
find the proportion of private information based trading is at the same level in ETF as in component stocks. 
Moreover, it is the private information based trading that drives up ETF’s contribution to the price 
formation of S&P 500. To summarize, there is strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that ETF is an 
important source of information and price discovery. 
The sections are arranged as followed. Section 2.2 reviews past literature. Section 2.3 details data sources 
and econometric methodology. In Section 2.4, We analyze the price discovery process among ETF trading 
and the entire index stocks trading for Standard & Poor 500. Section 2.5 focuses on the information nature 
of ETF trading. Robustness checks and extensions are conducted in Section 2.6. The last section concludes. 
 
2.2 Related Work 
Whether the trading of a basket of securities facilitates market efficiency has always been intriguing and 
interesting. Without index ETF and futures, people would devise trading strategies to trade a basket. Vijh 
(1994) points out that there are two possible effects of trading security basket. The positive impact would be 




negative impact would be increased price pressure or excess volatility, which could disrupt the capital 
market. He finds that the ever popular use of trading the S&P 500 stocks as a basket generates high daily 
variance of the NYSE and AMEX stocks even though nonsynchroneity is decreased. 
Subrahmanyam (1991) discusses the basket trading from the perspective of information revelation in his 
theoretical model. He proves that, conditional on sufficiently small cross-sectional variation in basket 
weights across securities, the trading of a basket may increase the overall informativeness of the price of the 
underlying portfolio. Both the portfolio price and component stock prices respond more to the systematic 
information and less to the security-specific information. 
In recent years equity market has seen sharp increase in trading activity, characterized by higher trading 
volume or turnover. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2010) document the trend and the accompanying 
improvement of market efficiency. They find that intraday volatility has decreased and prices behave more 
closely to random walk. This trend makes the intraday data better suited for studying issues like price 
formation than ever before. One that benefits this paper is that it allows more accurate construction of 
intraday price of index portfolio. For example, if there is trading in every second for each stock in the S&P 
500, we would not have to rely on delayed trade prices to compute the weighted average and the resulting 
index price would be fresh as up to the second. It also helps to validate the information share approach that 
assumes a common random walk for different price series. A unified random walk process warrants 
attributing information contribution between ETF and index portfolio a natural solution to studying the 
dynamics between these prices. 
The econometric approach used in this paper is developed in Hasbrouck (1995). The approach relies on the 
assumption that multiple price series share a common component and therefore are cointegrated. Arbitrage 
prevents the differences between price series diverging without bound. The common component underlying 
ETF and the index portfolio is the implicit efficient price of the index. Hasbrouck defines the efficient price 
as the random-walk component underlying all considered price vectors. The intensity of information of the 
efficient price can be measured with the innovation variance. For multiple price series, the information share 
of each series is its proportional contribution to the innovation variance of the common efficient price.  
The identification of a common random walk process is critical for the development of information share 
approach. A broader class is the so-called permanent-transitory decomposition. The permanent component 
of the decomposition is not necessarily a random walk, which means its variance would equal to the long-
run variance of the underlying price. Hasbrouck (2002) compares the permanent-transitory decomposition 
approach proposed by Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and his own information share approach which is a 
special case of the former. He suggests that it is hard to infer from the permanent-transitory decomposition 
because it does not render a clear interpretation of efficient price. 
Existing literature shows that there is a lead-lag relationship between futures and sport markets. Kawaller, 
Koch and Koch (1987) find the impacts of futures price movements on index lasts 20 to 45 minutes while 
the impacts of the other direction are arealy beyond 1 minute. Chan (1992) finds that the futures 
asymmetrically lead the cash index and all of its component stocks in price movements. He also shows that, 
when the market is driven by macroeconomic information, the futures have a larger lead. Therefore, futures 
market is a preferred location for investors to impound the index with market-wide news. 
A stronger dependence in both directions exists in the volatility of price movements according to Chan, 
Chan and Karolyi (1991). They find that price innovations originating in either cash or futures markets can 
predict the future volatility in the other market, indicating that both markets are important sources of price 




bond market. They find a high correlation of innovation shocks of the two markets and interpret it as 
evidence of common factors driving both liquidity and volatility. Moreover, volatility shocks lead the 
changes in liquidity. Hasbrouck (2003) finds that most of the price discovery of the index comes from the 
index futures market through E-mini trading. 
In this paper, We only consider the spot markets. Focusing solely on the spot market eliminates some of the 
concerns that the structural differences between spot and futures market could affect the price formation 
process in a way that is unrelated to the information dissemination. ETF and index component stocks are 
both traded on spot equity market. They are more likely to respond to the same set of information. 
Measuring how the information is discovered using the approach is still a valid method even though futures 
market is excluded from analysis. The approach does not specify how much total information is impounded 
in prices. In this paper, it measures the relative contribution of the ETF and index portfolio price series to 
their common underlying price. The interpretation of the approach is straightforward. If a price vector is 
found to have a larger share, it is the first to incorporate new information in the underlying price. However, 
it does not imply anything beyond the order of responses. 
 
2.3 Data Sources and Methodology 
TAQ database provides the intraday trading data from all ETF and stocks in the indexes studied. The lists 
of index stocks are obtained from iShares website, which publishes monthly composition of their ETF 
tracking S&P 500 and other indexes. The composition list might not be identical to the actual list of 
component stocks in the index but it should be very close. Trading volume and market value of individual 
stocks are from CRSP database. The trading volume and market cap of ETF are only available for S&P 500 
from Yahoo Finance and from YCharts, an online data provider. 
The econometric model on which the information share approach is based is a vector error correction 
model (VECM), which is ideal for studying the dynamics within a joint system of prices. The general form 
of VECM is 
∆ ∅ ∆ ∅ ∆ ⋯       (2.1) 
where   is a vector of prices with dimension of n × 1. β in the error correction term is the target of the 
adjustment process, i.e., the long-term value of the difference between the prices.  is an n - 1 column 
vector of the difference between the first price and the remaining prices. 
⋯        (2.2) 
All prices  in the system share the same random-walk  where . 
Economically, the random walk component is the efficient price. The innovations are linear in disturbances, 
. If the disturbances are uncorrelated, the innovation variance can be decomposed into 
components explained by innovations of each price, ∑ , where  is the absolute contribution of 
the ith price’s innovations to the common efficient price. In a system of multiple prices, the relative 
contribution, / , is price i’s information share. 
If the innovations are correlated, then there is no clean decomposition of the long-run variance. However, 




innovation to the total variance, thereby setting the upper and lower bounds for the information share of 
each price vector in the system. The bound can be tightened by using a fine time interval. 
It is difficult to interpret the coefficients estimated in VECM. Following Hasbrouck (2003), in addition to 
information shares, We use impulse response functions to describe how each price responds to the initial 
shock to one of the price within the system. The impulse response function is usually used to forecast the 
effects of a hypothetical innovation. It sets zero to all prior innovations and measure the effects of the 
innovation at time zero after certain periods have elapsed: 
∗ | , ⋯ 0  for 0      (2.3) 
To discuss the price impacts, it is more useful to measure the cumulative impulse response function: 
Ψ ∑           (2.4) 
There is little use of the actual trading of component stocks in the existing literature, possibly because the 
reconstruction of the intraday series of S&P 500 is a challenge. Mackinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) use the 
one-minute updated index quotes updated provided by Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The index quotes are 
actually constructed from latest trade prices of component stocks. The one-minute frequency is not small 
enough to avoid the sale prices in those thinly traded stocks. 
To improve the intraday series, We adopt the methodology in Hasbrouck (2003) to fill the intraday price of 
index to the unit of seconds with last-sale price. If there is no trading at a certain second, the price would be 
assigned to the last trading price. We repeat this for each stock in the index and generate a value-weighted 
S&P 500 price. Theoretically, this synthetic S&P 500 index (SYN) should have had the exact same random 
walk as the one that is underlying the two ETF if there was trading for each component stock in the index 
in every second. Even though empirically it is not true, and as it would be shown in the next section, there 
are differences in random walk processes between ETF and the synthesized index, the information share 
approach can still be applied to study the price dynamics between them because one can never deviate from 
the other price. 
 
2.4 Price Discovery in the S&P 500 
Since its inception in 1993, the SPDR (SPY), which is the first and largest ETF, has seen its market value 
almost one thousand times larger from 96 million to 90 billion dollars. IVV, the iShares ETF which also 
tracks S&P 500, debuted May 2000 with a market cap of 550 million dollars. As of today, it has assets of 
over 25 billion assets in total. Meanwhile, the market value of the entire S&P 500 increases from 313 billion 
in 1993 to 11 trillion dollars in 2011. 
The monthly average of daily trading volume also significantly increases for both ETF and the sum of all 
S&P 500 component stocks between September 2006 and December 2009. The daily number of traded 
shares has grown from 0.86 million to 3.8 million for IVV, from 68 million to 161 million for SPY, and 
from 2.45 billion to 4.39 billion for all S&P 500 component stocks summed. 
The initial change in one series and the response of others would appear to be contemporaneous even 
though they occur sequentially. Therefore, the decomposition of innovation variance cannot be uniquely 
determined since ETF and index portfolio prices are updated simultaneously. However, the upper and lower 




finer interval would minimize the correlation although the correlation cannot be completely eliminated. In 
this paper, We estimate the model with a 1-second sampling interval, with 5-minutes lags, following the 
same practice as in Hasbrouck (2003). 
The cumulative impulse response functions are drawn in Figure 2.1. Each graph depicts the responses of all 
three price vectors to an initial shock in the security indicated up to 10 minutes. Each point on the graph is 
an average of daily estimates over all fourth quarters from 2006 to 2009. The graphs clearly show that only 
two ETF price impacts converge, which is not surprising considering that they have the same underlying 
series. The real index is calculated using an index divisor to keep the index comparable throughout times 
when the number of outstanding shares changes. The synthesized index is simply a weighted average of 
market values of all component stocks. However, all the estimation is based on one-day data and the index 
divisor is constant at least for any particular day. Thus, it is unnecessary to adjust the intraday price of the 
index. The graphs show that the synthesized index price does not converge to the two ETF, implying that 
the random walk processes of the synthesized index and two ETF are not 100 percent identical. But it is 
easy to see that the responses of the synthesized index are locked in step along with one ETF to the initial 
shock to the other ETF. So the two prices, one represented by the two ETF and one by the synthesized, are 
still cointegrated. 
The graphs selected in Figure 2.1 show all three cumulative impulse response functions to the shock to 
SPDR in all fourth quarters. The time for IVV and SPY converging to each other is greatly reduced. In the 
fourth quarter of 2006, converging takes almost 4 minutes to finish. In the fourth quarter of 2009, it takes 
only 1 minute and 20 seconds. The reduction in converging time is more prominent when the shock is to 
IVV. In the fourth quarter of 2006, SPY and IVV still do not completely converge in the 10-minutes span. 
While in the fourth quarter of 2009, the process is done between 2 and 3 minutes. This improvement is 
helped by the more frequent trading in recent years, which eliminates arbitrage opportunities between two 
ETF faster. The graphs showing the impulse response functions to the shock to the synthetic index reveal 
the same trend that convergence between two ETF takes less time.  
Price impacts to own shocks for the two ETF are greatest at the time and then quickly die out while price 
impacts to own shocks for the index portfolio are the smallest at the initial, jump to a much higher level and 
then settle at slightly lower, which is still a lot higher than the initial level. The distinction indicates that the 
nature of shocks to ETF and the index are very different. Shocks to the ETF are quickly reflected in all 
price series and the permanent effect is smaller than the initial impact. In contrast, markets at the beginning 
underreact to the shocks to the index portfolio. It’s easy to understand the different patterns if we think that 
the shock to ETF is more public news related and easily absorbed by the market, which makes it ‘transitory’. 
The shock to the index portfolio actually contains shocks to all component stocks, thus rendering the 
market hard time to digest all in a short time and creating a ‘lasting’ effect. 
Figure 2.2 depicts the time series of long-run cumulative response functions. The long-run value is taken at 
the end of the 10-minutes iteration time window when convergence can be guaranteed. The long-run 
responses of the two ETF are exactly the same, both represented by the red plots. The blue series plots the 
responses of SYN. As discussed before, ETF and SYN still do not converge to the same level, although the 
distance between the two long-run levels is constant throughout the period. The three graphs represent the 
source of shocks respectively from SPY, IVV and SYN. The long-run response to the shocks have become 
smaller when the source of the innovation is SPY or SYN or become bigger when the source is IVV. To 
interpret, IVV has gained larger price impacts while SPY and SYN losing their impacts. From the sample 
means not shown, the innovations of SYN have the largest impacts, followed by SPY and IVV, although 
the gap is narrowing. 
6
The figures plot cumulative impulse response functions for prices of SPY, IVV and SYN. The three rows of figures correspond to a unit shock to SPY, IVV, and SYN
repectively and show four figures of the means of fourth quarters from 2006 to 2009. A VECM system of the three price series is used to compute the estimates and is
based on 1-second resolution.

































Initial unit shock to SPY - 2006 4th Quarter



































Initial unit shock to SPY - 2007 4th Quarter



































Initial unit shock to SPY - 2008 4th Quarter


































Initial unit shock to SPY - 2009 4th Quarter


































Initial unit shock to IVV - 2006 4th Quarter



































Initial unit shock to IVV - 2007 4th Quarter
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Initial unit shock to SYN - 2006 4th Quarter



































Initial unit shock to SYN - 2007 4th Quarter


































Initial unit shock to SYN - 2008 4th Quarter


































Initial unit shock to SYN - 2009 4th Quarter




The figures plot the long-run price impacts on SPY and SYN from a unit shock to SPY, IVV, and SYN in the sample period from Sept 1, 2006 to Dec 31, 2009. The
responses of IVV are identical to that of SPY and not shown here. The long-run level is taken at the end of the 10-minutes iteration process of the estimation of VECM










































































































Regardless of the needs of investors, the trading is based on the expectation of the overall index level. The 
top stock in the index in terms of market value is only around 5%. It is not likely that the shock to the 
individual component stock would have a big price impact on the ETF. Thus, the responses to the shock to 
ETF can be seen as the one that affects the entire index portfolio. In the case of S&P 500, it is close to the 
market-wide macro-related innovations. The responses to the index portfolio shocks are based on the 
expectations of the market as well as the individual stocks since the intraday trading is weighted across all 
stocks in the index.  In any trade, the price impact reflects both market-wide and stock-specific innovations. 
It is also worth noting that in all three cumulative response functions, the SPY and the index portfolio have 
locked up each other even in small ups and downs. The IVV curve is smoother and takes longer time to 
reach its permanent level. In some sense, it indicates a more tied up relation between the trading of the 
index portfolio and SPY, which has a longer history and a much larger trading volume than IVV. 
From above analysis on the impulse response functions, we assure that SPY and IVV have the same 
underlying random walk. From here, most of the statistics will be in a pair based on the underlying random 
walk of ETF (same for both SPY and IVV) and the synthesized index (SYN)1. In each iteration of the daily 
information share analysis, the contribution to the price discovery to any security is divided between the 
three price vectors.  Then a median number is taken among all daily iterations. For each pair of median 
information share, We add together the information shares of IVV and SPY, since an identical random walk 
underlies the two price vectors. Not shown here, while the distribution of Share_ETF_e, based on the ETF 
series, is very close to a standard normal distribution, Share_ETF_s, based on the synthesized index series, is 
skewed to the left. 
Panel A of Table 2.1 shows quarterly averages of these medians. The breakdown of the information shares 
of SPY and IVV are identical, proving again that their prices follow the same random walk. The median 
combined shares of SPY and IVV to the price discovery of the one underlying them vary from 40% to 59% 
for the studied period, with a mean of 45%, while the index portfolio has a share of 55% on average. For 
the random walk underlying the index portfolio, SPY and IVV combine for a share varying from 23% to 34% 
and averaging at 28%, while the mean of the contribution from the index portfolio is 72%. The bulk of the 
information in both random walks is discovered in the index portfolio trading, which is more dominant in 
its own price discovery. The result is not surprising in that we have seen the impulse response functions. 
The macro-related information is more evenly channeled in ETF and component stocks, while the stock-
specific information discovery is heavily tilted toward the index portfolio. The quarterly mean of percentage 
of the combined ETF contributing to the price discovery of ETF and index portfolio has a correlation 
coefficient of 0.87, which strongly suggests that the factors that make ETF a more likely source of price 
formation are the same for both random walk processes. 
How the information share is distributed can be correlated to trading volume and market value. It is likely 
that more frequent trading or larger market cap would lead to more price discovery. Panel A also shows the 
quarterly market cap ratio of SPY and IVV combined versus the index portfolio R_MCAP 
((SPY+IVV)/SYN). Obviously ETF is growing much faster than the S&P 500 index in terms of market cap. 
In the fourth quarter of 2006, the index is 155 times larger than the combined ETF market cap. Three years 
later, the index is only 93 times larger. Trading volume is an indicator of trading interest. R_VOL  is the 
ratio of average daily trading volume of the combined SPY and IVV against the index portfolio. In the 
fourth quarter of 2006, the daily combined trading volume of the index portfolio is 37 times that of SPY 
and IVV combined. In the same quarter in 2009, it is only 25 times. Despite the discrepancies shrinking fast 
between ETF and index portfolio in both trading volume and market cap, the information share distribution 
                                                            




is not shifting towards the ETF. Panel B of Table 2.1 is a correlation table of concurrent quarterly data 
including Share_ETF_e, Share_ETF_s, R_VOL, and R_MCAP. Two sets of correlations are reported for the 
two underlying random walk. Not surprisingly, the two Share_ETF variables are highly correlated. Both 
Share_ETF are negatively correlated to the two ratios but without significance. 
Table 2.1
 Price Discovery of S&P 500
This table presents the summary statistics of the price discovery of S&P 500. In Panel A, Share_ETF is the quarterly means of 
the combined share of two ETF, SPY and IVV, to the price formation of S&P 500. Share_ETF is estimated daily in a VAR 
system consisting of SPY, IVV and SYN, which is the intraday series of S&P 500 reconstructed from the trade prices of 
component stocks. Since the random walk of two ETF is slightly different from that of SYN, the estimates are reported 
separately for the three price series. For each day in the sample from September 1 2006 to December 31 2009, 600 iterations are 
performed using a VECM model. The daily Share_ETF is the mean of all medians of the estimation of information share 
contributed by two ETF. Only the fourth quarter results are shown. R_VOL and R_MCAP are the means of daily trading 
volume ratio and market capitalization ratio of two ETF combined against the entire S&P 500 component stocks combined. 
Panel B presents the (Pearson)correlation table of the variables. Since the estimates based on the random walk of SPY and IVV 
are very close, only the results based on the random walk of SPY (Share_ETF_e) and SYN (Share_ETF_s) are shown. *** denotes 
significance at the 99% level. 
Panel A: Quarterly means 
  
random walk 
innovation Share_ETF R_VOL R_MCAP 
2006 Q4 
SPY 
51.4% 0.6% 2.6% 
2007 Q4 50.6% 0.9% 5.6% 
2008 Q4 34.7% 1.4% 7.3% 
2009 Q4 47.6% 1.1% 3.8% 
2006 Q4 
IVV 
52.4% 0.6% 2.6% 
2007 Q4 50.7% 0.9% 5.6% 
2008 Q4 35.1% 1.4% 7.3% 
2009 Q4 48.0% 1.1% 3.8% 
2006 Q4 
SYN 
29.5% 0.6% 2.6% 
2007 Q4 30.4% 0.9% 5.6% 
2008 Q4 25.7% 1.4% 7.3% 
2009 Q4 28.8% 1.1% 3.8%
Panel B: Correlations 
  Share_ETF_e Share_ETF_s R_VOL R_MCAP 
Share_ETF_e 1 
Share_ETF_s 0.873*** 1
R_VOL -0.234 -0.217 1 
R_MCAP -0.409 0.102 0.630** 1 
 
Now we turn focus to the two ETF. It would be interesting to see whether SPY and IVV play the same role 
in terms of information discovery process. The data points when both ETF are available dates back as early 
as 2000. For both sets of underlying process, SPY dominates with above 80% of the shares.  Except for the 
first few quarters after the inception of IVV, the share distribution between the two is identical, suggesting 
that the market quickly eliminated any difference between the underlying random walk processes. However, 
Panel A of Table 2.2 tells us that the dominance of SPY just began to disappear in 2007. Until the first 
quarter of 2007, SPY provided most of the price discovery with at least 96% of the total share. But since 




quarter of 2007 and is 61 percent after that. The sudden and large change seems puzzling. While the trading 
volume of IVV steadily remain at about 1 to 2 percent that of SPY, the relative market value of IVV to 
SPY has increased and peaked at 2006.  
Table 2.2 
SPY vs. IVV
This table presents the summary statistics of the price discovery of S&P 500 in a VAR system consisting of SPY and IVV. In 
Panel A, for each day in the sample from May 19 2000 to December 31 2009, 600 iterations are performed using a VECM 
model. The daily Share_SPY_s (Share_SPY_i) is the mean of all medians of the estimation of information share contributed by 
SPY based on the underlying random walk of SPY (IVV). Only the fourth quarter results are shown. R_VOL and R_MCAP 
are the means of daily trading volume ratio and market capitalization ratio of IVV against SPY. Panel B presents the 
(Pearson)correlation table of the variables. Since the estimates based on the random walk of SPY and IVV are very close (as 
shown in Panel A), only the results based on the random walk of SPY are shown. 
Panel A: Quarterly means 
  Share_SPY_s Share_SPY_i R_VOL R_MCAP 
all sample 85.5% 82.4% 1.7% 19.8% 
2000 Q4 88.6% 75.3% 1.8% 2.6% 
2001 Q4 97.6% 96.6% 1.1% 21.0% 
2002 Q4 98.7% 98.7% 1.3% 13.8% 
2003 Q4 98.7% 98.6% 1.4% 17.6% 
2004 Q4 98.8% 98.8% 1.4% 20.8% 
2005 Q4 96.1% 96.1% 1.7% 24.1% 
2006 Q4 95.5% 95.5% 1.4% 28.1% 
2007 Q4 61.7% 61.1% 1.4% 19.0% 
2008 Q4 44.0% 44.0% 2.3% 16.5% 
2009 Q4 59.1% 59.1% 2.3% 25.5% 
Panel B: Correlations of daily observations 
  Share_SPY R_VOL R_MCAP 
Share_SPY 1 
R_VOL -0.76 1 
R_MCAP -0.01 -0.08 1 
 
The correlation matrix between concurrent quarterly variables is shown in Panel B of Table 2.2. Only the 
statistics based on SPY’s random walk is shown since those based on IVV is almost identical. The daily 
mean of the information share of IVV is positively correlated to the trading volume ratio. However, it is 
not necessary that the growing trading volume spurs the price discovery. Intuitively, it is inevitable that IVV 
would narrow the distance between itself and SPY in terms of trading, since they are essentially the ETF 






2.5 Private Information-based Trading in ETF 
We have seen the importance of ETF trading from their contribution to the information share of the 
underlying random walk. ETF contribute more to their own random walk than to that of the synthesized 
index. The difference can be that the trading data of the synthesized index simply contain more private 
information than the trading of ETF. Therefore, knowing the nature of ETF trading would help us further 
understand the ever-changing role of ETF. 
Let’s imagine extreme cases. Assuming that ETF trading is driven by public information only, does it still 
contribute to the price discovery of the underlying index? What if it is entirely private information driven? If 
ETF is indeed transiting to a more active role in the price discovery process, can we say it is because 
investors trading them possess more inside information? Public or private? Once we are able to answer all 
these questions, we will establish a connection between price formation of index and information contents 
of trading as well as how ETF fits in the big picture. 
There are mainly two approaches to infer how much trading is private information driven. One is based on 
the VAR model by Hasbrouck (1991b), which is the main analyzing tool We use in the first part of this 
paper. The variables used in the VAR system are sequential changes in the quote midpoint and an indicator 
variable to define buy or sell orders. Each price movement is either associated with the most recent trade or 
not. Those changes that are associated with the prior trade are driven by private information. Those that are 
orthogonal to the prior trade are considered only based on public information2. 
The same approach is used in many papers studying microstructural effects of trading mechanism including 
Barclay and Hendershott (2003) and Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011). 
The other approach developed to examine the amount of information revealed by trading is Probability of 
Informed Trading (PIN) developed by Easley and O’Hara (1992). Later, different variations of PIN are 
proposed to improve on the original one. Different from the sequential trade models, PIN is solely derived 
from the order arrival process. Neither the direction of a trade nor the quote midpoint changes depends on 
the prior order. Neither does it measure the absolute amount of information nor the proportion of private 
or public information. 
Throughout this paper, we are interested in how the trading of ETF has affected the index itself. The 
sequential model is an ideal fit examining the dynamics between trades and prices as well as accommodating 
several price series. We would use the Hasbrouck approach to determine the information nature of trades in 
ETF, which is also consistent with the analysis in the first part. 
The price variable considered in this section is quote midpoint . The other variable in the VAR is the 
trade direction . A trade is defined as buyer-initiated if its execution price is higher than the quote 
midpoint or seller-initiated if lower. There are trades executed exactly on midpoint. One solution is to look 
up the most recent price change. If the previous trade is a buy order, then the one following is also a buy 
order. We can trace all the way back if the direction of previous trade is not determined either. The signed 
trades are observed to be positively autocorrelated, i.e., buy orders tend to be followed by buy orders. The 
quote midpoints evolve according to the following: 
                                                            
2 Strictly speaking, the decomposition in this section is about informed trading and non-informed trading. Vega (2006) argues that it is the 
arrival rate of informed or uninformed traders that matters rather than whether the information is public or private. We use these concepts 





           (2.5) 
 is assumed to capture the transient microstructure imperfections that drive quote midpoints deviate from 
the efficient price.  is the efficient price following a random walk process: .  is the 
innovation of the random walk, .  is the innovation of the signed trades 
| , , …          (2.6) 
 is a white noise process. Using Cholesky factorizations, we have . The first component 
is the variance of a white noise, thus representing the public information. The second component is the 
variance of the signed trades’ innovation, representing the private information because it is trade-related. 
In a VAR system, different ordering of variables would generate different results in random-walk analysis of 
the innovations of VAR variables. When the variables in the system are various prices as in the first part, we 
can process all the different orderings and choose a statistical median or mean. In the end, it does not affect 
the interpretation of the results. However, it is not easy to interpret when the variables in the system are of 
distinctive natures, for example in this case, one describing the persistence of order flow q and the other 
price movements p, where the causal effects could run either way. If the trade direction is put first in the 
order, the structural model suggests that contemporaneous trade drives changes in price. If the order is 
reversed, then it is the price change that drives the direction of contemporaneous order. Moreover, we must 
specify the ordering first to explain the impulse response functions often used in the VAR system. Since we 
are more interested in how ETF trading changes the information discovery process of underlying index, 
only the results of the ordering where trade drives prices are reported unless mentioned else. The price 
variable can be trade prices or quote midpoints. Hasbrouck (2007) suggests that, in the frame of studying 
how trades contribute to the efficient price variance and impact the price in the long-run, the bid-ask 
midpoint is a better choice, because quotes are active between revisions while the most recent trade prices 
may still be outdated. 
According to Hasbrouck (1991b), we can impose a casual ordering, which is done through Cholesky 
factorization to decompose the variance of random-walk innovation into trade-related components and 
public information. The corresponding ratio of the component variance to the total variance is their 
contribution to the total information. The VAR system is estimated for each day from September 2006 to 
December 2009 for the trading of SPY and IVV. The intraday quotes and trades of SPY and IVV are 
obtained from TAQ database. The quotes are within the time frame from 9:30 to 16:00 from all trading 
locations. There are many original unsigned trades for SPY and many of them occur at the same second or 
consecutively. We decide to discard those trades because the actual order of these trades cannot be precisely 
determined at the 1-second-level resolution. Fortunately, we are still left of sufficiently large data for both 
ETF. 
As reported in Panel A of Table 2.3, the total variance of the random-walk innovation is only 0.25 bps on 
average for SPY (VT_SPY), which is not even one hundredth of the daily average for IVV (46 bps, 
VT_IVV). Figure 2.3 shows the total variance for SPY has a huge yet short-lived spike in October 2008, 
when the entire financial market was deep in the subprime mortgage crisis. In comparison, IVV has far 
more spikes scattered throughout the studied period and many of them are prolonged. One group of the 
spikes is clustered around October 2008. SPY is much larger in terms of trading volume and market 
capitalization. However, the intensity of information seems much stronger in the smaller ETF. In other 
words, investors prefer trading IVV whenever they have new information, public or private. SPY is more of 
an indexing ETF while IVV has more speculative trading. It is possibly because informed traders find it 
easy to move prices in the relatively smaller ETF. 
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VT_SPY VT_IVV PR_SPY PR_IVV
mean 0.25bps*** 46bps 7.6%*** 11.9%***
t-stat 5.82 1.05 32.52 32.02
Share_ETF_eShare_ETF_sVT_SPY VT_IVV PR_SPY PR_IVV VIX
Share_ETF_e 1
Share_ETF_s 0.83*** 1
VT_SPY -0.17*** -0.13*** 1
VT_IVV -0.09*** -0.07* 0.02 1
PR_SPY 0.17*** 0.16*** -0.14*** -0.03 1
PR_IVV -0.00 0.17 -0.08** -0.04 0.70*** 1
VIX -0.24*** -0.05 0.05 0.02 0.28*** 0.49*** 1
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
VT_SPY -247*** -198*** -185*** -264*** -200** -188***
-3.91 -3.2 -3.02 -4.11 -3.22 -3.06
VT_IVV -0.12** -0.1** -0.1** -0.12** -0.11** -0.11**
-2.54 -2.35 -2.38 -2.55 -2.33 -2.35
PR_SPY 0.81*** 0.73*** 0.74*** 0.39*** 0.60*** 0.70***
6.43 5.9 6.06 4.24 6.51 7.22
PR_IVV -0.38*** -0.14* -0.06 -0.007 0.23*** 0.31***
-4.86 -1.65 -0.61 -0.11 3.57 4.22
VIX -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.006***
-6.66 -5.65 -8.18 -5.7 -7.66 -6.12
R_VOL 2.33*** 2.41*** 2.34***
3.78 4.05 3.68
R_MCAP -0.39 -1.87 -0.29
-0.07 -0.36 -0.05




Information Content in ETF Trading
Panel B: Correlations of daily observations
Panel A: Summary statistics
This table shows how the price discovery process of S&P 500 is linked to the trading of ETF. The estimated model is a 
VAR system consisting of trade directions (q ) and quote midpoints (p ). The value of q  is 1 if the trade is buyer initiated 
and -1 if seller initialed. In the model, trades drive quote movements. The variance of the innovation of the quote 
movements (VT ) can be decomposed into the trade related variance component and non-trade related. The proportion of 
the trade related to the total variance is PR , representing the share of private information-based trading. The remaining is 
public information-based. Share_ETF , reported in Section 3, is the contribution made by two ETF combined to the 
efficient price of S&P 500. The underlying random walk process is of ETF series for Share_ETF_e  and of synthesized 
S&P 500 for Share_ETF_s . VIX  is the S&P 500 volatility index. R_VOL  and R_MCAP  are the means of daily trading 
volume ratio and market capitalization ratio of two ETF combined against the entire S&P 500 component stocks 
combined. The sample period is Sept 1 2006 to Dec 31 2009. Panel A shows the means of VT  and PR . Panel B is a 
(Pearson) correlation table of variables. Panel C presents the estimates from regressions with Share_ETF  as the dependent 




Table 2.3 continued 
Dependent variable: Share_ETF_s 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
VT_SPY -155*** -150*** -143** -166*** -150*** -144*** 
-2.8 -2.68 -2.57 -2.97 -2.66 -2.59 
VT_IVV -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* 
-1.77 -1.73 -1.67 -1.8 -1.73 -1.67 
PR_SPY 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.50*** 
5.23 5.12 5.23 3.84 4.34 5.74 
PR_IVV -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.1 0.02 0.07 0.19*** 
-3.58 -2.86 -1.16 0.39 1.21 2.88 
VIX -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 
-0.86 -1.03 -2.33 -1.14 -1.81 -1.54 
R_VOL 1.98*** 2.14*** 1.99*** 
3.55 3.99 3.49 
R_MCAP -9.86 -12.07*** -9.78* 
-1.98 -2.59 -1.92 
r-square 5% 5% 7% 3% 4% 7% 0% 1% 3%
 
As reported in Panel A of Table 2.3, the total variance of the random-walk innovation is only 0.25 bps on 
average for SPY (VT_SPY), which is not even one hundredth of the daily average for IVV (46 bps, 
VT_IVV). Figure 2.3 shows the total variance for SPY has a huge yet short-lived spike in October 2008, 
when the entire financial market was deep in the subprime mortgage crisis. In comparison, IVV has far 
more spikes scattered throughout the studied period and many of them are prolonged. One group of the 
spikes is clustered around October 2008. SPY is much larger in terms of trading volume and market 
capitalization. However, the intensity of information seems much stronger in the smaller ETF. In other 
words, investors prefer trading IVV whenever they have new information, public or private. SPY is more of 
an indexing ETF while IVV has more speculative trading. It is possibly because informed traders find it 
easy to move prices in the relatively smaller ETF. 
Panel A of Table 2.3 also shows the mean of the daily estimates of the proportion of total variance that can 
be attributed to private information (PR). 7.54 percent of the price moves are trade related on average for 
SPY (PR_SPY) and 11.90 percent for IVV (PR_IVV). Multiplying VT with PR, the absolute magnitude of 
the private information trading in IVV (5.47 bps) is 290 times larger than in SPY (0.019 bps), meaning that 
informed trading is even more concentrated in IVV than in SPY. 
Before we proceed on to multivariate analysis, there is one more variable that should be considered. VIX, 
the market volatility index, is used in the pricing of S&P 500 index options. It measures the market’s 
expectation of the next 30 days’ volatility. It is sometimes called ‘fear index’ since it reflects the risk appetites 
of investors in the short-term future. There might be a nontrivial interaction of how people perceive the 
market’s volatility and the location of price discovery. 
Correlations between the daily variables are shown in Panel B of Table 2.3 including price discovery 
contribution variables from Section 3. In sharp contrast of no correlation between the two total variances, 
the correlation coefficient between PR_SPY and PR_IVV is 0.70. This suggests that the distribution of  
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All plots are daily estimates of a VAR consisting of quotes and order flows of SPY and IVV from the sample period Sept 1 2006 to Dec 31 2009. The top figure plots the
proportion of quotes movement related to trade (PR). The second figure plots the total variance of innovation of the order flow (VT). The third figure plots VIX. The
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informed traders is similar for SPY and IVV even though the information intensity is very different. The 
cross-correlation between VT and PR yields -0.14 and -0.04 for SPY and IVV respectively, with only the 
former being significant. Among all variables, VIX is strongly correlated with both PR variables at 0.27 
(SPY) and 0.49 (IVV). It may be that, when the expectation of future volatility is high, investors who have 
the inside information are more likely to trade than those with only publicly known news, thus pushing 
higher the ratio of trade-related price movements. VIX has also significant and positive correlation with 
Share_ETF_e. The above variables are also plotted against time in Figure 2.3. 
To better understand the link between information share distribution and the trading of ETF, We run 
several specifications of regressions. Results are shown in Panel C of Table 2.3. The basic setup is: 
_ _ _ _ _   (2.7) 
Share_ETF of the top half based on the random walk of ETF and the bottom on SYN. All estimated 
coefficients are significant. Both VT estimates are negative. Let’s remember that the total variance includes 
both trade-related and unrelated components and represent overall information intensity in the trading. 
When the information surrounding the index is abundant, investors with private information might refrain 
from trading ETF since the trading is more likely dominated by public information. It can be said that the 
total information intensity weakens the role of ETF in price discovery. The coefficient on PR_SPY is 0.81. 
Quantitatively, this means that if the ratio of private information trading doubles its means from 7.5% to 
15%, the combined contribution of ETF to price discovery will rise about 6%. The negative sign on 
PR_IVV is puzzling since we expect SPY and IVV behave similarly in the regressions. Considering that the 
two PR variables are highly correlated, We separate SPY and IVV variables and rerun the regression in (4) 
and (7). When it is the only PR variable in the regression, its estimate is no longer statistically significant. 
It is necessary to control some important trending factors in the regressions. Although theoretically we do 
not know how exactly ETF’s contribution to price formation is linked to market factors, it can be affected 
by the market trend based on the simple fact that the ETF of S&P 500 index in many ways is tied to the 
entire market. VIX is added in regression (2): 
_ _ _ _ _   (2.8) 
The coefficient is significantly negative but the magnitude is extremely small (-0.003). Interestingly, the 
addition of VIX to the mix raises the R-square from 0.08 to 0.13. Monthly volume ratio (R_VOL) and 
quarterly market cap ratio (R_MCAP) are added in (3) as additional control variables. It should be noted 
that both ratios are two ETF combined against the entire S&P 500. As expected, the volume ratio has a 
positive coefficient. But the addition of these two ratios only raises the R-square by 0.02. 
In (8) and (9), the PR_IVV becomes significantly positive with the magnitude less than half of PR_SPY. 
Estimates on SPY are consistent for all regression specifications. The results clearly show an economically 
significant impact of trading of ETF on the price formation process. In the end, it is the private information 
that drives price discovery. In this sense, SPY and IVV do not behave anything like people are using them 
merely for indexing. Even though the mean of PR_SPY is only 7.5%, the change of PR_SPY has almost 
one-to-one change in Share_ETF_e. To summarize, after controlling for market volatility, trading volume, 
and market capitalization, how much informed trading of ETF crucially determine their contribution to the 
price formation of S&P 500 index. 
Share_ETF_e is the dependent variable in the alternative specifications. Most of the results are qualitatively 




the underlying random walk for SYN has a larger information set than that for ETF. Moreover, VIX has 
lost its explanatory power in four of the six regressions it is in and it does not raise the R-square as much as 
in the set of regressions on Share_ETF_s. 
We can see that there is a strong link between informed trading in ETF and its contribution to the price 
discovery of S&P 500 index. Intuitively, when we are talking about where the price is ‘discovered’, the 
source of information is mostly likely private. From this perspective, ETF behaves like a ‘normal’ stock. If 
ETF is used in most occasions for indexing, we would expect to see a low level of PR compared to other 
stocks. Moreover, the information contribution of ETF should not be driven by the level of informed 
trading. Therefore it is necessary to check how ETF compare to individual stocks in the index in the 
information contents revealed by trading. 
 
2.6 Robustness Checks and Extensions 
2.6.1 Benchmark Analysis 
In the above analysis, we see that SPY and IVV behave anything but as simply passive investment financial 
vehicles. To have a better understanding, We construct a benchmark group consisting of component stocks 
from S&P 500 index and apply the same VAR system to study whether they share the same trading 
characteristics with ETF. To be considered for selection, the stock must stay in the S&P 500 throughout the 
40-months period. 383 stocks, qualified for this criterion, are then ranked based on their average weights in 
the index. The stocks ranked at the 1st (XOM), 101st (AFL), 201st (CEG), and 301st (SVU) are included in 
the benchmark group to enable us compare cross-section of market capitalization. Using the TAQ data, We 
perform the same price-trade analysis by Hasbrouck (1991b). 
The summary statistics are listed in Panel A of Table 2.4. XOM by far has the largest market value, 
averaging 417 million dollars, followed by SPY (72 million). The rest of the three selected range from 5 to 
24 million. As of trading volume, SPY averages 45 million shares a day which is 7.7 times larger than the 
second place XOM, which in turn is 6.8 times larger than the third place AFL. IVV ranks right in the 
middle of the four selected stocks in both market cap and volume. Both ETF have a much larger monthly 
turnover rate than the individual stocks. PR of the benchmark ranges from 7.19% to 12.68%. Putting ETF 
in the ranking, SPY is in fifth and IVV is in second. The comparison of VT reveals the biggest gap between 
ETF and component stocks. VT_SPY is the smallest but still comparable to benchmark. However, 
VT_IVV seems just too big. Not reported here, all PR variables are strongly cross-correlated to each other. 
This is because most trading is public information related for ETF as well as component stocks. 
Figure 2.4 plots the time series of VT and PR for each benchmark stock. The regime shifts occur around 
the same time as ETF. We will leave the discussion in the next chapter. We rerun the regressions in 
specification (6) Panel C of Table 2.3 replacing SPY and IVV with the four selected stocks. Let’s remember 
that the dependent variable puts ETF ‘against’ the index portfolio in which all the four benchmark stocks 
are in it. We don’t have a theory of how the trading of component stocks is linked to the price formation of 
S&P 500. Nonetheless, the benchmark regressions may provide more insight of the relationship between 
trading and information. Results are shown in Panel B of Table 2.4 along with estimates of SPY and IVV 
from Panel C of Table 2.3. All the coefficients on PR are positive but only those of XOM and AFL are 
significant. Within the benchmark group, larger estimates are associated with larger market cap. For 1% 
increase of private information trading in XOM, the ETF contributes 0.28% more to the price discovery. 
The magnitude is smaller than IVV, which has a fraction of the market value of XOM. The R-square  
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XOM AFL CEG SVU enchmark grou SPY IVV
value rank 1st 101st 201st 301st
value weight 3.95% 0.21% 0.10% 0.05% 1.08%
market cap (in billions)
417.09 23.19 11.07 5.83 114.30 71.65 17.91
trading volume (in 
millions)
5.94 0.88 0.45 0.60 1.97 45.80 0.79
turnover 1.13 1.88 2.42 2.82 2.07 73.21 5.19
VT (in bps) 0.315 0.921 1.808 0.344 0.847 0.248 46
PR 11.98% 12.68% 7.19% 10.61% 10.61% 7.55% 11.91%
corr_VT_PR -0.17 -0.11 -0.32 -0.13 -0.18 -0.14 -0.04
VT PR VIX R_VOL R_MCAP r-square
XOM 23.7 0.28*** -0.006*** 2.05*** 3.13
0.29 3.66 -5.9 3.26 0.56 8%
AFL -51.1** 0.23*** -0.005*** 2.30*** 1.88
-2.05 3.46 3.62 3.62 0.33 9%
CEG -31.8 0.19 -0.006*** 1.98*** 7.10
-1.52 1.56 -5.94 3.03 1.34 7%
SVU -94.8** 0.12 -0.006*** 1.76*** 7.03
-2.35 1.36 -5.76 2.78 1.29 8%
SPY -188.9*** 0.70*** -0.005*** 2.41*** -1.87
-3.06 7.22 -5.7 4.05 -0.36 15%
IVV -0.11** 0.31*** -0.006*** 2.34*** -0.29
-2.35 4.22 -6.12 3.68 -0.05 9%
XOM 132.6* 0.23*** -0.002* 1.87*** -8.41*
1.82 3.28 -1.78 3.32 -1.69 3%
AFL -20.7 0.16*** -0.001 1.99*** -9.18*
-0.93 2.7 -1.15 3.51 -1.82 2%
CEG -9.4 0.10 -0.001 1.62*** -4.75
-0.51 0.88 -1.4 2.78 -1.01 1%
SVU -53.7 0.10 -0.001 1.7*** -5.92
-1.49 1.34 -1.38 3.01 -1.22 2%
SPY -144.7*** 0.50*** -0.001 2.14*** -12.07***
-2.59 5.74 -1.14 3.99 -2.59 7%
IVV -0.11** 0.31*** -0.006*** 2.34*** -0.29




This table shows whether ETF is different from the component stocks of S&P 500 in their trading linked to price discovery. Component 
stock considered for selection must be present in the index throughout the sample Sept 1 2006 to Dec 31 2009. Qualified stocks are then 
ranked by average monthly market capitalizaiton. Stocks ranked 1st, 101st, 201st, and 301st are then selected. The estimated model is a 
VAR system consisting of trade directions (q) and quote midpoints (p). The variance of the innovation of the quote movements (VT) can be 
decomposed into the trade related variance component and non-trade related. The proportion of the trade related to the total variance is PR, 
representing the share of private information-based trading. The remaining is public information-based. Share_ETF, reported in Section 3, is 
the contribution made by two ETF combined to the efficient price of S&P 500. VIX is the S&P 500 volatility index. R_VOL and 
R_MCAP are the means of daily trading volume ratio and market capitalization ratio of two ETF combined against the entire S&P 500 
component stocks combined. Panel A shows the summary stats of the selected stocks. Panel B presents the estimates from regressions with 
Share_ETF as the dependent variable on concurrent VT, PR and control variables for each selected stock. t-statistics are reported under the 
estimates. *, **, *** denotes significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively. The stats of SPY and IVV from previous previous 
Panel A: Comparison of summary statistics
Panel B: Regressions by stocks
Dependent variable: Share_ETF_e
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All plots are daily estimates of a VAR consisting of quotes and order flows of SPY and IVV from the sample period Sept 1 2006 to Dec 31 2009. The top figure plots the
proportion of quotes movement related to trade (PR). The second figure plots the total variance of innovation of the order flow (VT). The third figure plots VIX. The










































































































statistics are also correspondingly smaller. The fact that PR of large-cap stocks also has the explanatory 
power can be explained by the commonality of information composition of the entire market. Private 
information is revealed through the trading of all stocks including ETF. At the same time, ETF makes a 
larger contribution to price formation on days when there is more informed trading. On the other side, we 
can view component stocks part of the ETF. So it’s not surprising that the regressions on individual stocks 
yield smaller estimates with the same signs. 
Figure 2.3 also depicts the time series of the long-run cumulative responses of quote midpoints to a unit 
shock of signed trades. The estimation of response functions is based on the iterations of 60 lags of each 
quote. Each point in the graph is the daily average of the level of the cumulative response functions at the 
60th lag. In general, the same series of all six stocks move in the same direction over the time with the 
presence of the regime shift around March 2008. Particularly, the quote midpoints of two ETF have almost 
identical responses to the order flow. As for the long-run level of cumulative impulse responses, SPY and 
XOM show a sudden increase at the regime shift and the other four display a steady increase over the time. 
The long-run responses of prices to signed trades for both ETF strikingly resemble that of the ratio of 
trade-related price movements, with two structural breaks at the same time. It implies that, if trading based 
on private information is of larger portion for the day, it also has a larger long-run impact on the prices. In 
fact, the correlation between long-run cumulative responses of price to a shock to signed trade is 0.67 with 
significance for both ETF. 
The small distinctions between ETF and benchmark stocks reveal the fact that ETF is becoming a more 
active investment tool just like any other individual stock as opposed of remaining as a passive indexing tool. 
In the most, it can be said that ETF is just a much bigger ‘stock’ on which investors trade with their private 
information. 
 
2.6.2 Regime Shifts 
There is one concern. We see the apparent two structural breaks in Figure 2.3. PR_SPY on March 7 2008 is 
0.086 percent but the next day it jumps to 16.96 percent. Similarly, it increases from 0.0164 percent to 16.89 
percent for IVV between the two days. Another break occurs at the end of April 2007. Table 10a gives the 
mean PR for each period when we divide the time around the two breaks. The means for the three periods 
are 4.9%, 0.8% and 12% respectively for SPY. For IVV, it’s 2.3%, 0.8% and 21%. According to the TAQ 
documents on WRDS, there is no known major change made to the database. The regime shifts also appear 
in Figure 2.4 for the benchmark group. Thus, the driving factor must be system wide, affecting both ETF 
and component stocks. In this section, We provide some preliminary analysis. 
Mean statistics of all periods are presented in Panel A of Table 2.5. Period 1 has 163 daily observations from 
September 1 2006 to April 27 2007. Period 2 has 216 observations from April 30 2007 to March 7 2008. 
Period 3 has 459 observations from March 10 2008 to December 31 2009. VT_IVV changes dramatically 
between the breaks. It jumps from 2.3 bps in the second period to 82 bps in the third. Not reported here, 
the correlation between the VT_SPY and VT_IVV is significantly high in Period 1 and 2 at 0.67 and 0.54. 
The correlation between the two PR is negative in Period 2. The cross-correlations between VT and PR are 
all negative except for IVV in Period 2. Most of the abnormal statistics are caused by the extremely low PR 







This table shows the results divided by two regime shifts in April 2007 and March 2008. The estimated model is a VAR 
system consisting of trade directions (q) and quote midpoints (p). In the model, trades drive quote movements. The 
variance of the innovation of the quote movements (VT) can be decomposed into the trade related variance component 
and non-trade related. The proportion of the trade related to the total variance is PR, representing the share of private 
information-based trading. The remaining is public information-based. Share_ETF, reported in Section 3, is the 
contribution made by two ETF combined to the efficient price of S&P 500. The underlying random walk process is of 
ETF series for Share_ETF_e and of synthesized S&P 500 for Share_ETF_s. VIX is the S&P 500 volatility index. 
R_VOL and R_MCAP are the means of daily trading volume ratio and market capitalization ratio of two ETF combined 
against the entire S&P 500 component stocks combined. Panel A shows the means of VT and PR. Panel B presents the 
estimates from regressions with Share_ETF as the dependent variable on concurrent VT, PR and control variables in 
different specifications. t-statistics are reported under the estimates. *, **, *** denotes significance at 90%, 95%, and 
99% level respectively. 








12/31/09 all sample 
Share_ETF_e 45.91% 45.47% 44.47% 44.97% 
Share_ETF_s 27.24% 29.19% 28.34% 28.37% 
VT_SPY (bps) 0.44 0.21 0.2 0.25 
VT_IVV (bps) 3.56 7.45 81.7 46 
PR_SPY 4.95% 0.07% 12.00% 7.56% 
PR_IVV 2.27% 0.77% 20.60% 11.92% 
VIX 12 21 33 26 
R_VOL 2.97% 5.58% 5.12% 4.82% 
R_MCAP 0.63% 0.79% 1.05% 0.90% 
 
Regressions are also redone by periods in Panel B of Table 2.5 with comparison to the overall results from 
Panel B. In general, the results of Period 3 are the closest to the overall. For the underlying process of ETF, 
the coefficient on PR_IVV is significantly positive in Period 3 while it is significantly negative in the second, 
which leads to further suspicion that Period 2 might be an anomaly. Most interestingly, the R-square are all 
larger except for one in regressions by periods. One possible explanation is that, some fundamental 
differences between the three periods reduce the explanatory power of regressions when all observations are 
pooled together. R-square is also generally the largest in Period 3, which could mean that the trading of ETF 
has larger impacts on the price discovery process of S&P 500 index! The results for dependent variable 
Share_ETF_s are similar1. 
                                                            
1 Unfortunately, we still don’t have a clear explanation of what causing the regime shifts. All we know is that it affects the entire market, 
including individual stocks and ETF. But it is definitely interesting for further studies because it might be related to some fundamental changes 






























VT_SPY -185.8*** -109.8 -25.73 -57.26 -188.9*** -136.97* -521.8** -137.3
-3.02 -1.39 -0.1 -0.35 -3.06 -1.82 -2.22 -0.85
VT_IVV -0.1** -73.89 -360.7*** -0.09** -0.11** -105.9* -366.9*** -0.11**
-2.38 -1.27 -3.77 -2.08 -2.35 -1.91 -4.42 -2.42
PR_SPY 0.74*** 0.68 8.05 0.90*** 0.70*** 0.74 5.55 0.96***
6.06 1.2 0.66 6.06 7.22 1.31 0.42 6.43
PR_IVV -0.06 0.58 -4.92*** 0.27** 0.31*** 0.56 -4.88*** 0.43***
-0.61 0.79 -4.22 2.17 4.22 0.76 -4.22 3.43
VIX -0.005*** -0.008 -0.002 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.017 -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.011 -0.002 -0.006
-5.65 -0.53 -0.47 -4.78 -5.7 -1.3 -3.13 -4.27 -6.12 -0.77 -0.54 -5.37
R_VOL 2.33*** -9.65** -0.37 3.85*** 2.41*** -6.93* 0.54 3.19*** 2.34*** -8.21** -0.40 5.00***
3.78 -2.42 -0.2 4.19 4.05 -1.92 0.27 3.59 3.68 -2.07 -0.22 5.39
R_MCAP -0.39 74.04 21.12* -5.68 -1.87 22.24 26.05** -6.76 -0.29 52.98 18.87 -12.3*
-0.07 0.74 1.76 -0.81 -0.36 0.23 2.09 -0.96 -0.05 0.54 1.65 -1.71
r-square 15% 19% 25% 26% 15% 17% 12% 24% 9% 16% 24% 18%
VT_SPY -143.4** -164.6** 120.3 4.59 -144.7*** -155.9** -206.5 -39.76
-2.57 -2.47 0.48 0.03 -2.59 -2.48 -0.92 -0.27
VT_IVV -0.07* 11.77 -232.6** -0.05 -0.07* -30.1 -211.3** -0.07
-1.67 0.24 -2.46 -1.29 -1.67 -0.64 -2.57 -1.64
PR_SPY 0.58*** 0.21 5.87 0.80*** 0.50*** 0.26 3.66 -0.83***
5.23 0.44 0.48 5.8 5.74 0.56 0.29 6.07
PR_IVV -0.1 0.64 -4.09*** 0.15 0.19*** 0.52 -4.03*** 0.28**
-1.16 1.04 -3.54 1.29 2.88 0.83 -3.51 2.43
VIX -0.0009 0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.007* -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002
-1.03 0.34 0.06 -0.98 -1.14 0.56 -1.96 -0.65 -1.54 0.01 0.02 -1.65
R_VOL 1.98*** -5.40 0.12 2.39*** 2.14*** -4.35 0.92 2.02** 1.99*** -3.52 0.05 3.44***
3.55 -1.61 0.07 2.82 3.99 -1.44 0.49 2.48 3.49 -1.13 0.03 4.03
R_MCAP -9.86 23.9 -4.04 -5.94 -12.07*** 19.74 -1.89 -6.53 -9.78* 25.0 -5.44 -11.87*
-1.98 0.28 -0.34 -0.92 -2.59 0.25 -0.16 -1.01 -1.92 0.3 -0.48 -1.79
r-square 7% 8% 14% 14% 7% 7% 6% 13% 3% 2% 14% 6%
Dependent variable: Share_ETF_s
Dependent variable: Share_ETF_e





2.7 Concluding Remarks 
Using a reconstructed intraday series of S&P 500 index, this paper presents a unique microstructural 
perspective of ETF on its ever changing role. SPY and IVV, the two ETF tracking S&P 500, make up 
nearly half of the price discovery in the spot markets comprised of the trading of all component stocks and 
ETF. The trading of SPY and IVV is as much private information driven as individual stocks in the index 
are. The two major findings outline the growing importance of ETF in the information dissemination 
process in the equity market.  
From the empirics, we can see that the transformation has far from being complete. Therefore, the future 
research should continue observing the relationship between ETF and its underlying index and update on 
the existing literature. 
The findings in my paper also reveal a mixing role of ETF. They are basket securities but in the meantime 
the information contents in their trading are not much different from individual stocks. A theoretical model 
examining the interaction between ETF and index component stocks is indeed needed for a better 
understanding of ETF. 
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CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL FLOW AND INFORMATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The discovery of large amount of information flow induced by the trading of ETF is seen as an increasingly 
popular active investment strategy. From the perspective of promoting information dissemination and 
market efficiency, institutional investors are important players who can exert significant impacts through 
their large holdings and huge volumes of trading. They observe the flow of information on the market in a 
very different manner than individual investors and trade accordingly. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2011) observe an increase in market efficiency for those stocks widely held by institutions. They attribute 
the decrease in intraday volatility and price conforming more closely to random walk to a more effective 
trading by institutions on their private information. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) demonstrate 
that automated algorithmic trading greatly facilitate the trading for institutions. Considering a higher than 
average ownership by institutions, the trading of ETF is believed to strengthen the information flow to the 
ETFs’ underlying indexes. 
However, the hazard of a potential manipulation by the institutional investors exists. The problem is 
particularly acute in ETF trading because of their large impacts on the prices and thus the overall market 
indices. In a new study of the tech bubble at the end of the 20th century, Griffin et al. (2011) provides 
evidence on that institution’ trading behavior could be very disruptive and causing harm to the market. They 
show that institutions speculatively purchased overpriced tech stocks until a coordinated broad sell-off 
without a justified expectation of future price appreciation consistent with fundamentals. Individual 
investors, on the other hand, are victimized by continuously buying while institutions are selling. 
Of all the stocks we could consider to investigate the issue, ETF stands out as particularly interesting 
securities as far as we are concerned with institutional ownership. In Chapter 1 we find that ETF is 
transforming from a pure passive investment vehicle incepted with indexing as the main use to a popular 
choice of incorporating private information. Institutions have reasons to love ETF. They are perhaps the 
most liquid securities with huge trading volumes. They are ideal for portfolio indexing or hedging purposes. 
And most recently, they become an increasingly important source of information origination. Studying the 
institutional flow of ETF would also provide us a better understanding of the role of ETF in the market. 
To answer the question whether institutions conduct information-based or speculative trading and its 
implications on the market, we examine the relationship between institutional trading flow and the 
information nature of trading. We hypothesize that: 1) a strong link between the trading flow and the 
proportion of private information-based trading is an indication of institutional investors’ incorporating 
private information in their trading; 2) a weak or nonexistent link would mean a likely ‘noise trader’ role for 
institutions. 
Using the same set of data, we also test whether institutions behave differently when trading ETF. Chapter 1 
shows that the proportion of private information-based trading in ETF is as much as in a selected group of 
S&P 500 component stocks. This implies that the overall information quality in ETF trading is not 
fundamentally different in other stocks. However, institutional investors have more motivations to trade 
ETF than individual investors and some of them are not driven by information. We hypothesize that the 
link between institutional flow and information contents is stronger among non-ETF stocks. Observing the 
alternative that they behave similarly in terms of relationship would be further proof that ETF is utilized by 
institutional investors to profit from private information. In general, we want to contribute to not only the 
high frequency data literature on institutional trading but also analyze the evolving ETF. 
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The paper is organized as follows. In the follow section we briefly review the literature related to 
institutional trading and describe TAQ and 13-F, the two databases we use, in details. In section 3.3, we 
compute and discuss the trading imbalance which is used in constructing daily flow. In section 3.4, the daily 
institutional flows are estimated using the in-sample regression method. We then related it to the 
informational nature of trading in a set of structural and reduced form regressions in section 3.5. Additional 
analysis on the construction of institutional flow is performed in section 3.6. And the last section concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature Review and Data Description 
Most of the previous work using the 13-F filings to the SEC focus on the relationship of contemporaneous 
or lag returns and the ownership changes. In the influential work by Nofsinger and Sias (1999), they identify 
herding and feedback trading as a common practice among institutional investors. Excessive buying or 
selling may cause the prices deviating from their fundamental level and destabilize the market. The 
momentum-chasing behavior of institutions is documented using intraday frequency data in addition to the 
often used quarterly data. Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) study the Nasdaq 100 and find that 
institutions chase short-term price movements while individual investors are in the opposite trading 
positions. In the other direction, the trading of institutional investors has little impact on the future returns 
economically. Neither are they able to find evidence of price reversal which could result from institutions’ 
trend chasing behavior.  
However, the quarterly data is inadequate to examine any kinds of microstructural behavior of institutions. 
Recently researchers start using high frequency data to infer the trading behavior of institutional investors. 
Puckett and Yan (2011), relying on a large proprietary database, find institutions earn significant abnormal 
returns intra-quarterly, suggesting that they are able to capture short-lived profitable trading opportunities. It 
supports the argument that managers do possess superior stock-picking abilities to some extent. Without 
proprietary data, other researchers attempt to construct institutional trades from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) 
database. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) adopt a cutoff criterion that defines a trade initiated by institutions if 
the trade size is above a certain threshold. Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwarts (2009) propose a finer 
method to infer institutional trading flows. They argue that trades of different sizes have disproportional 
institutional trading and one can therefore obtain a more accurate description of the flow. They divide 
trades into twenty bins based on their dollar volumes with preset bounds. The same quarter trading 
imbalance of classified trades of each bin is aggregated and used as explanatory variable in a regression with 
the quarterly changes from 13-F as the regressand. The obtained estimates are then used to compute the 
unobservable daily institutional flow. 
We use Hasbrouck (1991b) to analyze the information contents of trading. He assumes that prices follow a 
random walk process and can be deviated by informed trading. In a Vector Autoregression Error Correction 
(VECM) model consisting of quote midpoints and trade direction indicators, the total variance of the 
innovation term is then divided into the proportion that is contributed by the quotes or by the trades. The 
latter is then defined as the private information trading. 
Our work is the first to associate institutional ownership changes with the information dissemination 
mechanism with high frequency data that is better suited to analyze information related microstructure 
topics. We study the dynamics of institutional flow and information in a structural Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) model. We also add more evidence of the transforming nature of ETF by discussing the role of 
institutional investors. 
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This paper uses two databases, TAQ (Trade and Quote) and 13-F Institutional Holdings from Thomson-
Reuters (formerly CDA/Spectrum). The intraday trades and quotes that are needed to compute daily 
imbalance come from TAQ. Following the widely used algorithm proposed in Lee and Ready (1991), we 
define a trade as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) when its execution price is higher (lower) than the quote 
midpoint. Usually trades that are executed exactly on midpoint are classified using a tick test. Since the 
number of daily trades increase dramatically in recent years, there is a huge quantity of trades of which the 
trade direction cannot be identified without tick test. But in order to precisely compute daily imbalance, we 
avoid any ambiguity by considering those trades as unclassifiable. 
Following Campbell et al. (2009), for each stock studied, we first exclude the trades that are labeled as 
‘bundled or ‘split’ in TAQ and those of which the timestamp is before 10:00am because trades size is an 
important variable to construct daily institutional ownership change. In the first half hour of trading, the 
price is usually determined by opening auction in which the recording of trade size is not reliable just as in 
cases when trades are bundled or split. These observations along with those of which the direction of trades 
need to be determined by tick test are together defined as unclassifiable. 
TAQ is also used to decompose daily trades into private or public information driven. Following Hasbrouck 
(1991), we study quote prices and trade directions (buyer or seller initiated) in a Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) system to determine how much of the total variance of innovation (VT) to the underlying price can 
be attributed to trade related, which is then defined as the proportion of private information (PR). The 
values of VT and PR are recalculated since the sample period is different from in Chapter 1. 
13-F provides us the quarterly changes in institutional ownership. There are many kinds of inconsistencies 
in 13-F. We have done a lot of cleaning. 1) The current quarter ownership is not equal to lag ownership plus 
change. We assume that the ownership number not the change is correct; 2) multiple entries for the same 
manager-stock-quarter observation. We retain only the first record in the original order; 3) there are missing 
stock-quarter observations for the same manager. We drop those unreported quarters from the sample. 
There are 3,992 occasions in which the gap is one quarter and 1,033 two quarters, compared to 108,976 
occasions in which there is no missing observation. We could fill out the data using the average of the two 
months preceding and following the missing quarter. However, since we are interested in the aggregate 
institutional ownership changes, there is no point of assuming any change for a single institution. 
 
3.3 Imbalance and Holdings 
The sample we choose is from 2002 to 2009. IVV debuted in 2000. The first few quarters of trading data 
from IVV is very volatile so we want to pick up a starting point where things are stabilized. The studies 
period covers the financial crisis and may provide us an opportunity to examine any potential structural 
breaks the data presents. 
Our first step is to identify the volume by institutional investors from all daily trading. Griffin, Harris, and 
Topaloglu (2003) rely on the proprietary data on Nasdaq 100 which classifies the originator of both sides of 
all trades as an individual, an institution or a market maker. Our method is based on Campbell et al. (2009). 
Their proposed specification allows separate coefficients for each dollar-volume bin: 
∆ ∝ ∆ ⋯       (3.1) 
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where the dependent variable ∆  is the quarterly changes in institutional ownership1 of the stock from 13-
F. Regressors include lag quarterly change ∆ , lag quarterly ownership level . The remaining 
regressors are aggregated unclassified total trade volume ( , and aggregated trade imbalances2 for all bins 
( 	 	 ) from all trading days in a quarter. 
We make a few modifications. First, their bins are in the units of dollar volumes. Considering the cross-
sectional price level can vary in a wide range, we argue that it would be more accurate to use trading volume 
normalized by the number of outstanding shares. For example, a $10,000 transaction for a relatively small 
stock is more likely to be initiated by an institution than a $10,000 transaction for a large stock. Second, their 
sample used for estimation pools all stocks together and then the estimates are used to compute daily flow 
of each stock. To improve, we estimate the regression for each stock and obtain separate sets of estimates to 
be used to compute the daily flow for that particular stock. This also addresses the concern that the 
relationship between total flow and institutional flow may be different for stocks. Third, Campbell et al. 
eventually estimate a transformation function that smooth out the trade flows between bins, because there is 
lack of large trades for small stocks. All the stocks we consider are large-caps from S&P 500 and therefore 
we stick to the linear model (3.1). 
For each quarter, we sort each classified buy/sell into a certain number of bins based on normalized trading 
volumes and then compute the daily imbalance for each bin. It is however difficult to determine the number 
of bins and the length of each bin. With results not being shown here, we experimented with many settings 
with the number of bins up to ten. However, the addition of more explanatory variables results in too many 
imprecisely estimated parameters and does not make additional contribution to the explanatory power of the 
model. We settle for simply using three bins, with the bottom 20% as the ‘small’ trades, top 20% as the 
‘large’ trades, and those in between the intermediate ones. Normally, we consider the combined intermediate 
and large trades are initiated by institutions. In later section, we would also utilize the rule used in Lee and 
Radhakrishna (2000) and set the cutoff point at the smallest 20% in terms of trade size and other settings. 
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows the mean of quarterly imbalance (imb) of each stock-bin aggregated from daily 
imbalance. Imbalances are positive for all stock-bins and increase monotonically with the larger bins for 
non-ETF, while the largest imbalance appears in the intermediate bin for ETF. To take into account the fact 
that the average trade size of a higher quintile is always larger, we standardize each quarter’s imbalance by 
dividing the quarterly average size of a trade within the bin (sdd_imb). All of the six stocks have the largest 
standardized imbalance in the intermediate bin except for XOM. Larger imbalance possibly indicates that 
market participants’ opinions are more aligned. So for the small and large bins where the concentration of 
individual and institutional investors is high, there is a higher degree of heterogeneity of the trade direction 
than for the intermediate bins. It is also in line with the findings of Chakravarty (2001) and Barclay and 
Warner (1993) that institutional investors prefer medium-sized trades to minimize price impacts. In Panel B, 
we examine the correlations of imbalances across stocks for each bin. It is easy to spot that correlation of 
intermediate bins is largest. It is more interesting to note that negative almost all the negative correlations 
are related to the smallest bin of CEG and the largest bin of SPY. Panel C shows the correlations of 
imbalances across bins for each stock. It is not surprising that the intermediate and large bins have the 




1 All ownership variables, without specifically indicated, are measured in percentages of the outstanding number of shares. 




This table presents the statistics for trading imbalance during the sample period of 2002 to 2009. All trades are categorized based 
on their sizes relative to the number of outstanding shares in a particular quarter. The 'small' bin contains bottom 20 percent of 
trades sizes; the 'large' bin contains top 20 percent; and the 'intermediate' bin has all 60 percent in the middle. Imbalance (imb) is 
defined as buying volume minus selling in percentage numbers relative to the number of outstanding shares. In Panel A, 
sdd_imb is the imbalance in each bin standardized by the average size of a trade in that bin. The last two columns show the 
standardized trade sized of buy and sell orders classified using Lee and Ready (1991). Panel B presents Pearson Correlation of 
imb across stocks for each bin and Panel C across bins for each stock. 
Panel A: Mean and standardized imbalance 
  bin level imb sdd_imb sdd_buy sdd_sell 
small 0.02 973 87,182 86,209 
AFL intermediate 0.18 2,088 210,163 208,075 
  large 0.90 1,329 73,529 72,200 
small 0.04 659 52,059 51,401 
CEG intermediate 0.22 1,281 105,677 104,396 
large 1.27 1,001 40,304 39,303 
  small 0.03 -234 41,922 42,156 
IVV intermediate 0.63 1,679 123,592 121,912 
  large 0.55 -463 39,747 40,210 
small 0.04 1,440 1,489,571 1,488,131 
SPY intermediate 0.32 4,896 4,061,787 4,056,891 
large 0.08 992 1,328,719 1,327,727 
  small 0.22 3,428 43,789 40,361 
SVU intermediate 1.23 7,624 136,325 128,702 
  large 4.45 4,304 43,759 39,455 
small 0.01 7,809 339,574 331,765 
XOM intermediate 0.05 -11,095 1,187,187 1,198,282 
large 0.30 -12,175 369,437 381,612 
Panel B: Correlations across stocks 
` AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU   
  -0.39         small 
CEG 0.37 intermediate 
  0.56 large 
  0.57 -0.27 small 
IVV 0.50 0.38 intermediate 
  0.15 0.15 large 
  0.16 -0.54 0.20     small 
SPY 0.27 -0.11 0.27 intermediate 
  -0.20 -0.36 -0.07     large 
  0.18 -0.16 -0.02 0.33 small 
SVU 0.57 0.62 0.44 0.31 intermediate 
  0.35 0.39 0.29 -0.17 large 
  0.65 -0.35 0.40 0.00 0.49 small 
XOM 0.80 0.42 0.48 0.38 0.74 intermediate 




  Table 3.1 continued   
Panel C: Correlations across bins 
  small-intermediate small-large intermediate-large 
AFL 0.31 0.41 0.8 
CEG -0.03 0.1 0.62
IVV 0.44 0.31 0.5 
SPY 0.61 -0.11 0.2 
SVU 0.28 0.2 0.82 
XOM 0.49 0.58 0.87 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of imbalance and the almost identical standardized imbalance for each stock-
bin. For all stock-bins except for large bin of SPY, the volatility of imbalance or standardized imbalance 
substantially increases in recent year with a downward trend in level. The resembling patterns prove that 
there are some common time factors that affect the order imbalance for all stocks. The larger swing is 
mostly likely the result of dramatic increase in trading activities which is documented in Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2011). The average imbalance moving from positive to negative implies that the trading 




This table presents institutional holdings (H) related statistics. The quarterly H is calculated from 13-F database. The 
daily imbalance (imb) and standardized imbalance (sdd_imb) are computed from TAQ database and then aggregated 
over a quarter. Sample period is 2002 to 2009. Panel A shows the mean and standard deviations of H. Panel B shows 
the Pearson correlations of the two measures of imbalance. Panel C shows the correlations between H and 
imb/sdd_imb. 
Panel A: Institutional holdings from 13-F (H) 
AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM 
mean (%) 58.3 65.4 41.5 60 84.9 49.6 
s.t.d. (%) 4.3 4.6 7.5 17.3 11.1 2.4 
Panel B: Correlations of measures of imbalance (imb, sdd_imb) 
  AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM 
0.52 0.46 0.59 0.59 0.33 0.64 
Panel C: Correlations of quarterly holdings and imbalance 
  AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM 
imbalance -0.47 -0.2 0.13 0.22 0.09 -0.16 
standardized imbalance -0.42 -0.19 0.14 -0.02 0.08 -0.18 
In Panel A of Table 3.2, computed from 13-F data, the average holdings by institutions (H) during the 
studied period vary from 41% to 85% with IVV the lowest. Figure 3.2 shows that except for IVV, the 
institutional ownership has increased over the years. Panel B presents the correlations of the two measures 
of trading imbalance. The correlation coefficient between standardized imbalance and unstandardized 
ranges from 0.33 to 0.63, indicating that we should be careful of interpreting using the raw imbalance. 
Nevertheless, there is not much difference between the two when being linked to holdings. The correlation 
between imb and H in Panel C is positive for the two ETF along with the smallest benchmark stock SVU. 
For sdd_imb, the correlation for SPY becomes slightly negative. All other three have negative correlations.  
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The figures plot the trading imbalance of each stock-bin combination. Trades are sorted by sizes relative to outstanding
shares in each stock-quarter. Top and bottom 20 percent are defined as small and large bins and the rest as intermediate.
The studied period is from 2002 to 2009
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The figures plot the institutional holdings in percentage (H) from 13-F during the sample period is from 2002 to 2009.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Large order imbalance possibly signals homogeneity of market opinion or lower. It is possible that more 
institutional investors choose to hold ETF as indexing or hedging tools based on some macro-level 
information. On the other side, more institutions can imply a more divided opinion on individual stocks. 
 
3.4 Daily Institutional Flow 
In the estimated regression model (3.1), the changes in institutional holdings (∆H) is explained by the right-
side variables including quarterly aggregated imbalance by bins, unclassified total volume computed from 
TAQ, the lagged total holdings by institutions (lagH) and the lagged changes in holdings (lag∆H). Here we 
assume that the coefficients of buy orders and sell orders are identical within the same bin. The regression 
can be seen as aggregating imbalances of all bins over all days in a quarter to see how they combine to 
explain the quarterly institutional flow. The estimated coefficients are then used to compute the fitted values 
at the daily level. In Table 3.3 we present the results of estimation based on different bin settings, large-
intermediate-small, large-small along with those based on no division at all and on deciles. 
None of the coefficients on bin imbalances is precisely estimated. However, the F-stats show that jointly the 
coefficients on the independent variables are not zero except for SPY. Multicollinearity tests based on 
variance inflation factor or Tolerance not shown here exclude the possibility of existence of high degree of 
collinearity among explanatory variables. It is shown in a setting where there are ten equally divided bins the 
coefficients are then jointly significant for SPY, which implies that the institutional trading in SPY is more 
layered in terms of trading size than any other stocks. All lagH are significantly negatively correlated to H, 
which indicates the long-term mean-reversion of holdings by institutions. lag∆H has mostly insignificant 
negative estimated coefficients. Unexpectedly the adjusted  is smaller when we assume different 
coefficients on bins than identical coefficients on all bins except only for SPY and XOM. From here, we will 
construct the daily institutional flow. 
Means and medians of the daily and quarterly flow are shown in Panel A of Table 3.4. The largest and 
smallest estimated flows usually appear in the setting with no separate bins or with 10-bins. The mean daily 
institutional flow estimations are positive but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are zero. The 
mean is suspiciously larger for SPY compared to other stocks, possibly due to more trading interests in SPY 
from institutional investors. Panel B presents the Pearson correlations between different measures of daily 
institutional flow by stocks. In the case of CEG and IVV, all correlations are larger than 0.96. For the other 
stocks, 3-bins settings have on average the highest correlations with other measures except for XOM. It 
seems that the ideal number of bins is different for each stock. However, it is likely to be safe using the 3-
bins setting as its estimates are highly correlated with those of other settings. 
Figure 3.3 plots the aggregate quarterly institutional flow over the time. For all stocks, there is a steady 
increase in the flow and a peak appearing sometime around the first quarter of 2009. It is interesting that 
these evolutions mirror those of imbalances in Figure 3.1. In other words, the imbalances are falling, while 
institutional investors more actively increase their holdings. Reconciliation could be that institutional 





AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM
adj. R-square 0.35 0.42 0.48 0.03 0.44 0.19
lagH -0.17 -0.8*** -1.07*** -0.27** -0.42* -0.59**
lag∆H -0.38** 0.12 -0.03 -0.16 -0.29 -0.08
small 4.94 -6.39 5.64 2.21 2.37 -25.07
intermediate 0.48 0.51 2.2 -0.7 -0.47 -4.64
large -0.34 -0.61 -0.01 0.13 -0.71 1.87
unclassed 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.16
adj. R-square 0.34 0.41 0.49 0.04 0.44 0.18
lagH -0.16 -0.78*** -1.04*** -0.29** -0.42** -0.63**
lag∆H -0.4** 0.09 -0.01 -0.13 -0.29 -0.01
small 4.54 -6.22 4.12 1.12 2.58 -23.97
large -0.19 -0.46 0.18 0.08 -0.69 0.72
unclassified 0.06 0 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.18
adj. R-square 0.31 0.39 0.5 0.08 0.43 0.13
lagH -0.18 -0.71*** -1.08*** -0.27** -0.41* -0.52**
lag∆H -0.39** 0.06 -0.01 -0.13 -0.3* 0.03
imbalance -0.16 -0.66 0.24 0.09 -0.53 0
unclassified 0.04 -0.08 -0.08 0.13 0 0.12
adj. R-square 0.23 0.11 0.37 0.74 0.57 0.72
lagH -0.25* -0.94** -1.18*** -0.28** -0.42 -0.73**
lag∆H -0.27 0.26 0.02 0.06 -0.28 -0.12
-2.85 -0.67 -3.53 20.32*** 17.32 21.44
b_2 11.01 -7.6 9.21 5.22* 1.08 0.73
b_3 19.67 -12.3 18.91 8.68 1.13 4.61
b_4 -1.44 15.59 -4.38 -0.66 2.75 -13.84
b_5 -29.63** -5.97 3.38 1.42 -12.16 -19.55
b_6 5.33 2.69 7.15 -8.69** 0.55 40.58**
b_7 -1.68 0.11 -9.3 -3.95 -0.47 -18.89
b_8 7.61 4.83 -4.2 4.28** 4.38 0.53
b_9 1.67 2.22 5.56 -2.38 -5.84 -16.68
bin_10 (largest) -1.15 -1.16 -0.12 0.19* -0.19 1.6
unclassified 0.13 0.1 -0.07 0 0.04 0.01*
one universal bin
deciles by trade size
b_1 (smallest)
This table presents the estimates of the regression (3.1), where the dependent variable is the quarterly changes from 
13-F. Regressors include lag quarterly change (lag ∆H), lag quarterly ownership level (lagH), daily unclassified total 
trade volume (U), and daily trade imbalances for all bins. The number of bins in different regression settings are 
three, two, one and ten respectively. In 3-bins setting, 'small' contains the bottom 20 percent, 'large' the top 20 
percent, and 'intermediate' the middle. In 2-bins setting, 'small' the bottom 20 percent and 'large' the rest. Deciles are 
represented in the 10-bins setting. 'One universal bin' does not differentiate trade sizes. Significance level are 
signified in shades. *, **, *** denotes significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively.
Table 3.3
Flow Estimation
3-bins by trade size




Panel A of this table presents the mean and median statistics for the estimated institutional flows 
from regressions (3.1), where the dependent variable is the quarterly changes from 13-F. Regressors 
include lag quarterly change (lag∆H), lag quarterly ownership level (lagH), daily unclassified total trade 
volume (U), and daily trade imbalances for all bins. The fitted values are calculated daily excluding 
quarterly variables (lagH, lag∆H).The quarterly flow is aggregated using the daily fitted values. In 3-
bins setting, 'small' contains the bottom 20 percent, 'large' the top 20 percent, and 'intermediate' the 
middle. In 2-bins setting, 'small' the bottom 20 percent and 'large' the rest. Deciles are represented in 
the 10-bins setting. '1-bin' does not differentiate trade sizes. Panel B presents the correlations of 
different measures of daily flows. 
Panel A: Estimated flows 
AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM 
daily mean 
3-bins 0.03 0.18 0.34 2.61 0.3 0.03 
2-bins 0.04 0.2 0.27 1.17 0.26 0.02 
1-bin 0.05 0.1 0.12 1.18 0.28 0.05 
10-bins 0.03 0.13 0.31 5.08 0.31 0.01 
daily median 
3-bins 0.02 0.1 0.2 1.75 0.2 0.02 
2-bins 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.74 0.16 0.02 
1-bin 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.74 0.18 0.04 
10-bins 0.02 0.07 0.18 3.49 0.21 0.01 
quarterly mean 
3-bins 2.3 11.18 21.66 164.42 18.95 1.63 
2-bins 2.38 12.32 16.91 73.9 16.16 1.35 
1-bin 3.36 6.32 7.45 74.35 17.93 3 
10-bins 1.74 7.92 19.6 320.16 19.5 0.79 
quarterly median 
3-bins 2.03 9.37 14.48 122.52 17.27 1.46 
2-bins 2.07 9.97 10.91 57.69 13.61 1.25 
1-bin 3.03 5.13 5.7 57.37 15.43 2.92 
10-bins 1.51 6.89 13.17 234.34 18.48 0.79 
Panel B: Correlations of estimated daily flows 
AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM 
3-bins/2-bins 0.997 0.998 0.992 0.961 0.984 0.938 
3-bins/1-bin 0.979 0.996 0.991 0.974 0.986 0.823 
3-bins/10-bins 0.937 0.996 0.999 0.99 0.968 0.904 
2-bins/1-bin 0.98 0.999 0.969 0.999 0.999 0.967 
2-bins/10-bins 0.932 0.99 0.994 0.914 0.915 0.95 
1-bin/10-bins 0.973 0.988 0.989 0.934 0.92 0.929 
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The figures plot the estimated quarterly institutional flows in-sample and out-of-sample methods along with the quarterly
ownership changes computed from 13-F in the sample period 2002 to 2009. Out-of-sample estimation is conducted on a
rolling basis. The initial estimation period is 2002 to 2003. The estimates are then used to fit the regression for the 1st
quarter of 2004. The daily flows are then aggregated to quarterly level and used to replace the original variable from the
13-F database. The newly constructed flow is then used to expand the sample and the procedures are repeated until we




































































































































































































3.5 Institutional Trading and Information 
The motives to hold equity or change holdings can be different for institutional and individual investors, 
which in turn may be reflected in the information contents of trading. Institutions in many ways are believed 
to possess more private information than individual investors and their trading behavior is more informative. 
We hypothesize that, in the days when the magnitude of institutions changing their positions is larger, the 
trading is more likely to be private information driven. 
It is also a good opportunity to examine how close the motive on trading ETF is to that on trading common 
stocks. If it is observed that the nature of the relationship between institutional trading flow and 
informational trading is the same for ETF and benchmark stocks, we may conclude that investors trade 
ETF behind similar motives. 
We measure the trading intensity (flow) of institutions by taking the absolute value of the daily trading flow 
(∆H). The trading flow is not symmetric as we have seen that the mean is positive and there is an increasing 
trend in recent years. The new information that arrives in the market and motivates institutional trading is 
possibly not the same when institutions increase or decrease one percent of their holdings. Nevertheless, 
most of the daily changes in institutional holdings are positive. Conversely, the trading pattern of 
institutional investors can possibly predict future composition of information of the market, as it is possibly 
driving the price level. To study the information-trading dynamics, we introduce two variables from the first 
chapter. PR is the proportion of private information in a trading day, measured by the contribution to the 
total variance (VT) of trade-related price movement in a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
consisting of trades and prices.  
∑ ∑ ,      (3.2) 
∑ ∑ ,        (3.3) 
In the structural Vector Autoregression (VAR) system shown above that consists of the magnitude of 
institutional flow (flow) and PR, we treat both variables as endogenous and each is regressed on up to five 
lags of both. PR is allowed to have a contemporaneous impact on flow. The structural regressions are 
performed on the two ETF and four component stocks of S&P 500. We also estimate the reduced form 
regression for the same VAR. 
Panel A of Table 3.5 shows the estimation results. For equation (3.2), all coefficients of the 
contemporaneous PR are negative and precisely estimated except for IVV of which the coefficient is not 
significant. Therefore, for those days institutional investors in overall decide to not change their positions in 
these stocks, the proportion of private-information based trading is actually higher. Indeed we observe a 
strong correlation between institutional flow and information contents. But this is the opposite of what we 
hypothesize about the sign. It is usually assumed that institutional investors possess more private 
information and incorporate the information in the trading. If we hold on to this assumption, possible 
reconciliation to the paradox are that the private information held by different institutions is different or 
opinions on the same information among institutions remain widely differentiated so that the imbalance is 
reduced as institutions trade against each other. The PR coefficient of SPY (-1.34) is much larger than that 
of other stocks in terms of magnitude. All of the coefficients on the lagged absolute flows are statistically 
positive except for one, showing some degree of autocorrelation of overall institutional flow magnitude. The 
5th lag of flow comes with coefficient of much larger magnitude than other lags. Since the regression is 
conducted in daily frequency, there is likely to be weekday effects on the institutional flow. The first two lags 
of PR are mostly negatively correlated to flow while the signs on larger PR lags are mostly positive. The  
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AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM
PR -0.11*** -0.14*** 0.07 -1.34*** -0.33*** -0.07**
PR_lag1 0.00 -0.01 0.13 -1.28 0.06 -0.06 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.2*** 0.33***
-0.03 -0.05 0.15 -1.62 -0.01 -0.08**
PR_lag2 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.03 -0.02 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.25***
-0.02 0.03 0.16 -0.16 -0.05 -0.04
PR_lag3 0.03 -0.06 0.16 1.13 -0.15 0.03 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.12*** 0.13***
0.01 -0.07 0.17 0.87 -0.19 0.02
PR_lag4 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.25 0.18 -0.03 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.1*** 0.13*** 0.08***
0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.12 0.13 -0.03
PR_lag5 0.07** 0.05 -0.16 0.22 0.07 0.12 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.14***
0.06 0.03 -0.15 0.01 0.02 0.11
flow_lag1 0.11*** 0.23*** 0.04* -0.01 0.08*** 0.01 0.01 -0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
flow_lag2 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.01 0.04** 0.09*** 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.004** 0.00 0.00 0.06***
flow_lag3 0.07*** -0.01 0.00 0.03* 0.06*** 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.03
flow_lag4 0.12*** -0.00255 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.07*** -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03
flow_lag5 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.19*** 0.62*** 0.47*** 0.41*** 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
intercept 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.34*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00
AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM
14.15% 12.97% 7.42% 12.40% 12.91% 11.54% 10 18 382 11 8 3









dependent variable flow PR
Panel A: Two-variable VAR
Panel A contains the estimates of a structural Vector Autoregression of daily institutional trading flow (in absolute value) and PR, the proportion of private-information 
based trading in a day with five lags. PR is allowed to have a contemporaneous impact on flow. Reduced form estimates are only partially presented for regressions with 
flow as dependent variable. Estimates with statistical significance are represented in different shades. Panel B presents the estimates from a VAR consisting of flow, PR, 
and VT, the daily total variance of the random walk of the underlying price. The structural VAR allows contemporaneous effects of VT on flow. Estimated coefficients of 
flow, PR and their lag values are omitted. *, **, *** denotes significance at 90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively.
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Table 3.5 continued 
Panel B: 3-variable VAR 
    VT VT_lag1 VT_lag2 VT_lag3 VT_lag4 VT_lag5 
flow 
AFL 0.22** -0.17* 0.01 0.03 -0.10 0.03 
CEG -0.21 0.33*** 0.77*** 0.78*** -0.14 -0.92*** 
IVV 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 0.12* 
SPY 1.02 0.44 -0.69 -2.53* -2.09 -1.61 
SVU 0.94* -1.05* -0.88 -0.68 -0.77 0.51 
XOM 0.44** -0.07 0.34 0.02 -0.19 0.06 
PR 
AFL   -0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.16** 
CEG -0.04 0.05 -0.11 0.05 -0.02 
IVV 0.03 0.00 -0.02* 0.02* -0.04*** 
SPY 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 
SVU 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.13 -0.06 
XOM   0.24 0.28* 0.35** -0.54*** 0.45*** 
VT 
AFL 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.1*** 
CEG 0.34*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.16*** 
IVV 0.3*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.2*** 
SPY 0.08*** 0.05** 0.02 0.02 0.02 
SVU 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 
XOM 0.24*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.21*** 0.04*** 
 
reversal of the signs on lagged PR implies that it is possible that institutions refrain from trading against 
abundant information on the market up to two days and start reposition themselves in the trading of those 
stocks hereafter. 
Results from the reduced form regressions are only partially shown because most of the estimated 
coefficients are identical. Even those that are different when flow is the dependent variable yield similar 
coefficients to the structural form estimations.  
For equation (3.3), the current daily PR is regressed on lag values of PR and flow up to five lags. There is a 
strong autocorrelation of PR, suggesting that private information intensity tends to extend for a couple of 
days. The coefficients of flow on PR are mixed in signs with few significant estimates. Institutional investors 
are known to frequently trade against noise traders. If we believe that institutional investors engage in stealth 
trading to move stock price without revealing themselves, then it’s not hard to see why their trading does 
not give away too much on the information side either.  
∑ ∑ ∑ ,   (3.4) 
∑ ∑ ∑ ,      (3.5) 
∑ ∑ ∑ ,      (3.6) 
We also explore the addition of VT in the endogenous variable list. As VT measures the total information 
intensity, it may be related to the perception of institutional investors of the entire market and their 
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corresponding trading behavior. Panel B of Table 5 presents selected estimates from the 3-variables-system 
regressions. We omit those coefficients on lag flow and PR, which are very close to those in the 2-variables 
system. Of five of the six stocks (CEG is the exception) and three with statistical significance, VT has a 
positive correlation with the contemporaneous daily flow. The opposite signs of VT and PR on flow indicate 
that institutions respond to public and private information very differently. The coefficients are mostly 
positive on recent lags of VT and negative on larger lags. In the regressions with VT as dependent variables, 
the autocorrelation coefficients are decreasing with larger lags but keeping the same signs. 
The empirical results above reveal another important observation. Of the six stocks, PR ranges from 7.45% 
to 14.15%, with the lowest value in IVV. VT of IVV is 0.1311 and the second largest is 0.0181. The total 
information intensity of the daily trading in IVV is about almost ten times larger than the rest. The relative 
amount of private information in the trading (PR) of IVV is 7.5%, about at least 35% lower than the rest. 
Moreover, we find a strong relationship between institutional trading flows and PR in all but IVV. The 
standout of IVV against other stocks implies that SPY might resemble other stocks in terms of 
informational trading more than IVV, which is also tracking S&P 500.  
Interestingly, IVV also has the lowest institutional holdings with 41%. It can be argued that the relatively 
small holdings by institution investors who possess more private information makes the trading of IVV 
fundamentally different from other stocks. A small PR means more speculative trading. For ETF, it also 
means that the trading is less information based and more likely for indexing or hedging purposes. 
Therefore, even though IVV and SPY are both ETF tracking the same index, the composition of market 
participants and the trading motives behind are quite different. 
 
3.6 Additional Analysis 
The estimation of daily flows of institution investors is critical for the analysis of its relationship with the 
nature of information in the trading. We first perform an out-of-sample estimation on a rolling basis with 
the regression method. The initial estimation period is 2002 to 2003. The estimates are then used to fit ∆H, 
the change in daily institutional ownership for the 1st quarter of 2004. We aggregate the daily flows to 
quarterly level and replace with these fitted values the original variable from the 13-F database. We then use 
the newly constructed ∆H to expand the sample and rerun the estimation. The procedures are repeated until 
we reach the last quarter of 2009. 
Table 3.6 shows the summary statistics with in-sample and out-of-sample estimation in comparison. In 
terms of flow magnitude, the mean and standard deviation of daily flow are much smaller for the out-of-
sample estimation except for SPY. However, for AFL and CEG, the out-of-sample values are only 
marginally correlated to the in-sample values, with correlation coefficient at 0.73 and 0.50 (larger than 0.91 
for the other four). The plots of the daily flows in Figure 3.3 confirm both observations. We also present 
the correlation table of the aggregated quarterly daily flows and the original institutional ownership changes 
from 13-F. The correlation coefficients of in-sample and out-of-sample flows are now negative and even 
lower for AFL and CEG respectively (-0.13 and 0.23) and still strong for the rest. However, the raw ∆H 
data from 13-F is not correlated to the constructed quarterly flows at all. It should be noted that the 
quarterly variables (lag ∆H and lag H) that are used in the regression to estimate daily flows are actually left 
out when fitting the values. In the end, our purpose is to capture the daily dynamics and the accuracy of 
quarterly aggregated data is not of much concern. Nevertheless, it shows that we need to distinguish 
                                                            
1 The summary statistics of VT and PR are slightly different from Chapter 1 because the sample period is different. 
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between different stocks when choosing the methodology for the linear estimation of institutional flows. 
Not shown here, the estimates from the regressions using the out-of-sample method in comparison with the 
in-sample method are qualitatively identical, suggesting that the dynamics of daily flows are captured in the 
same way for both estimation methods. 
Table 3.6
Out-of-sample Estimation of Flow
This table compares the statisticis of the institutional flows estimated using in-sample and out-of-sampe 
methods. Out-of-sample estimation is conducted on a rolling basis. The initial estimation period is 2002 to 
2003. The estimates are then used to fit ∆H, the change in daily institutional ownership for the 1st quarter 
of 2004. The daily flows are then aggregated to quarterly level and used to replace the original variable from 
the 13-F database. The newly constructed ∆H is then used to expand the sample and the procedures are 
repeated until we reach the last quarter of 2009. The first table shows means and standard deviations. The 
second table shows the two-way correlations. 
AFL CEG IVV SPY SVU XOM 
Means and standard deviations of quarterly flows
in-sample 2.3 11.18 21.66 164.42 18.95 1.63 
(s.t.d.) 1.3 7.04 18.05 99.83 11.15 0.85 
out-of-sample 0.71 2.1 2.33 178.7 5.62 0.36 
(s.t.d.) 0.76 1.21 1.5 110.31 2.83 0.15 
Correlations of quarterly flows
in-sample/out-of-sample -0.129 0.226 0.901 0.999 0.977 0.968 
in-sample/13-F 0.056 -0.158 0.054 -0.013 -0.057 0.163 
out-of-sample/13-F 0.025 -0.162 0 -0.009 -0.024 0.168 
 
We also conduct robustness tests to address the concern that the number of bins to separate trading size 
may also affect the estimation of institutional flows. The increase in the number of bins would leave many 
of the bins blank while no separation of trading size is expected to yield imprecise estimates of daily flows. 
The estimates from using the fitted values with the setting of ten bins or without separation of trade sizes 
are again qualitatively the same as the 3-bins setting. It seems that the dynamics is not sensitive to how we 
construct the daily institutional flows. 
 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
Institutional investors have long been considered as ‘informed’ traders who use their information advantage 
to chase returns. Accordingly the past literature has been focusing on the relationship between return and 
trading in the microstructural framework. Our paper is the first to analyze the actual information quality of 
the institutional trading by examining a structural VAR model which is estimated from high frequency 
trading data. This is probably a more fundamental question than the return issue because it directly asks 
whether institutions make moves based on private information. We use 3-bins setting to classify trades 
based on sizes and infer daily flows transacted by institutional investors. We find that the daily ownership 
changes by institutions in five of the six studied stocks are negatively correlated to contemporaneous PR, 
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the proportion of private information-driven trading, and its recent two lags. There are two possible 
explanations: 1) in overall institutional investors are not synchronous with a high level of private 
information-based trading. There are divided opinions on the information among institutions, resulting in 
buy volumes cancelling sell volumes. Therefore, even though PR is high, the imbalance is low; 2) 
institutional investors prefer to camouflage themselves in stealth trading. They would rather trade against 
noise traders than other institutions. Moreover, with the presence of noise traders, it is difficult for outsiders 
to capture the information revealed by institutional investors’ trading. Therefore, we observe large 
institutional flows when the amount of information is abundant on the market and observe small flows then 
the information is relatively scarce. 
Even though we are short of a complete theory, the strong negative correlation between institutional flow 
and informational contents in the trading is sufficient to prove that the behavior of institutional investors is 
motivated by information in some way or another. In the meanwhile, we also show that institutions might 
have motives to trade ETF different from index stocks, especially for IVV. 
Directions of future studies would rely on a more accurate high-frequency trading datasets of institutions. 
More importantly, we would need a theory to explain the intraday or short-term behavior of institutional 
investors related to the information reflected on the market. After all, empirically it is easy to show the 





CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation provides empirical evidence showing the interaction of information flows and the trading 
of various financial securities by different market participants. The first essay finds that ETF contributes 
significantly to the price formation of its underlying index and their contribution is positively correlated to 
how much their trading is driven by private information. The second essay proves that institutional 
investors are not likely noise traders. The direction of institutional daily volumes is negatively correlated to 
the proportion of private information in the overall trading. we also show that institutions might have 
motives to trade ETF different from index stocks. 
Emphasis is on the comparisons between ETF and index component stocks. Similarities are revealed in the 
findings of the first essay while differences in those of the second essay. Nevertheless, we believe that ETF 
is transforming into similar roles played by index component stocks, in the sense that they are traded as part 
of active portfolio management. 
A complete theoretical model would help us better understand the empirics regarding ETF’s role in the 
price discovery and information distribution. The theory should parsimoniously describe the investors’ 
choice trading ETF or component stocks based on the private information they possess. It also should 
distinguish the trading motivations between institutional and individual investors. Another direction of 
future studies would be the utilization of newly introduced ultra-high-frequency data. The new database 
would undoubtedly give researchers tools to analyze the evolving trading mechanism adopted by investors 
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